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RECENT DECISIONS
Criminal Law-Criminal Responsibility of Proprietor of Tavern
for Illegal Sales of Operator in Proprietor's Absence.-Defendant,
a tavern keeper holding a Retail Class B liquor license, had in his
employ a bartender, who was licensed as an operator pursuant to
Sec. 66.05 Wisconsin Statutes. He was convicted of violation of Sec.
176.05(3) Wisconsin Statutes requiring taverns to be closed for business between 1 A.M. and 8 A.M. of each day, and was fined $1.00 and
costs. On June 13, 1942, at 2:08 A.M., the bartender had sold liquor
while the defendant was absent from his establishment. Defendant,
on appeal, contended that he was not criminally responsible for the
act of his bartender when he was not present at the time of the act,
because Sec. 176.05(11) Wisconsin Statutes imposes upon the operator licensee the responsibility for acts of all persons serving as waiters
or in any other manner any fermented malt beverages or intoxicating
liquor to customers; that in the absence of the proprietor licensee the
operator licensee on the premises assumes the responsibility and control. It was held that a sale of liquor by a licensed operator during the
proprietor licensee's absence does not relieve the proprietor, since
intent is not the controlling element and the licensing of an operator
in the proprietor licensee's employ is a method of further regulation
and not a means of relieving the proprietor licensee from liability.
State v. Grams, 6 N.W. (2d) 191 (Wis. 1942).
Since the middle of the 19th century courts in England and America have repeatedly held that criminal intent, or "mens rea" is not
required to convict a person of offenses which imperil or jeopordize
the public welfare,-crimes that are police offenses of a regulatory
nature with punishment less severe than prison sentences. Crimes that
do not require "mens rea" include such offenses as illegal sales of
intoxicating liquor; sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs; sales
of misbranded articles; violations of anti-narcotic acts; criminal nuisances; violations of traffic regulations; violations of motor-vehicle
laws; and violations of general police regulations, passed for the
safety, health, or well-being of the community. Cases on this subject
are legion. The following decisions illustrate the point: A butcher was
found guilty of a crime who sold adulterated food without knowledge
of the fact that the food was diseased. Hobbs v. Winchester Corporation, 2 K.B. 471. In 1861 a defendant was convicted for being a common seller of intoxicating liquor although he neither knew nor supposed the beverage to be intoxicating. Commonwealth v. Boynton, 2
Allen 160 (Mass.). Defendant company was held responsible for permitting its cars to be run without rear lights, as required by statute,
with no proof of guilty knowledge. Provincial Motor Cab Co. v. Dun-
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ning, 2 K.B. 599. A seller was convicted for the sale of oleomargarine
though he had no knowledge that he was selling oleomargarine. State v.
Ro'iers, 95 Maine 94, 49 Atl. 564 (1901). And, when in violation of a
statute the defendant unknowingly employed a child under the age of
fourteen, it was held knowledge was not an essential ingredient of the
crime and defendant might be punished for the act alone. Kendall v.
State, 148 N.E. 367.
The promiscuous and unregulated sale of intoxicating liquor is so
obviously contrary to public safety and morals that the legislatures of
the states have acted on their police power in restricting traffic in liquor.
Weinberg v. Kluxnesky, 236 Wis. 99, 294 N.W. 530 (1940). The public
safety and welfare so far outweigh the right of an individual to absolvence from punishment for a crime committed without intent that decisions are accepted as correct and necessary which hold against the
defendant proprietor for sales of intoxicating liquor, even when he is
not present at the time of the sale. In State v. Holm, 201 Minn. 53, 275
N.W. 401 (1937), the court said that proof that the sale with the liquor
dealer's knowledge or consent is unnecessary to sustain conviction of
a dealer for selling intoxicating liquor to a minor, it being sufficient if
the sale is shown to have been made by the dealer's employees or
servants. The same principle underlying such decisions was expressed
by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in State v. Schull, 279 N.W.
241 in the following language: "In the prohibition or punishment of
particular acts, the state may in the maintenance of a public policy
provide that he who shall do them shall do them at his peril and will
not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance. Many
instances of this are to be found in regulatory measures in the exercise
of what is called the police power where the emphasis of the statute
is evidently upon the achievement of some social betterment rather
than the punishment of the crimes as in cases of mala in se." Regulations prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquor to minors (the violation for which defendants were punished in the cases cited above) and
regulations requiring retail establishments of the Class B type to be
closed during certain hours as in State v. Grams, supra, appear to come
within the same category.
Certainly the desire and necessity of protecting the public furnishes sufficient ground for the court's decision holding the proprietor
of a tavern responsible for the conduct of his business, whether he is
present or not, and the Wisconsin court obviously was motivated by
this consideration, as was the court in State v. Sobeiman, 199 Minn.
232, when it said statutes are to be so construed as to suppress the
mischief and advance the remedy, to promote rather than defeat the
purpose of the legislation.
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However, when consideration is given to the agency aspect of
State v. Grams, supra, some doubt might arise as to the soundness of
the decision. Reference is made in the decision to several Wisconsin
cases, holding the proprietor for acts of his agent, during the absence
of the owner. Conlin v. Wausau, 137 Wis. 311, 118 N.W. 810, was
decided in 1908; Reismier v. State, 148 Wis. 593, 135 N.W. 153, in
1912; and Olson v. State, 143 Wis. 413, 127 N.W. 975, in 1910. At the
time these cases were decided employees of the proprietor were not
required to be. licensed, so obviously the only way to control the sale
of intoxicating liquor was to hold the owner of the establishment as
principal for the wrongful acts of his agent.
In 1933 Wisconsin passed the law requiring an operator's license
for "any person who shall draw or remove any fermented malt beverage for sale or consumption from any barrel, keg, cask, bottle or
other container in which fermented malt beverages shall be stored or
kept on premises requiring a Class B license, for sale or service to a
consumer for consumption in or upon the premises where sold."
Sec. 66.05 (10) (a) (6) Wis. Stat., 1941. The requirements for
an operator are the same as for a proprietor licensee as to
character, citizenship and residency. Sec. 66.05 (10)
(i)
(1)
and Sec. 66;05 (10) (g) (1) Wis. Stat., 1941. And, under Sec.
66.05(10) (i)(2) it is arguable that both the operator and proprietor
are on a par as to responsibility since it says "there shall be upon
premises operated under a Class B license, at all times, the licensee or
some person who shall have an operator's license and who shall be
responsible for the acts of all persons serving as waiters, or in any other
manner, any fermented malt beverages to customers. No person other
than the licensee shall serve fermented malt beverages in any place
operated under the Class B license unless he shall possess an operator's
license, or unless he shall be under the immediate supervision of the
licensee or a person holding an operator's license, who shall be at the
time of such service upon said premises." Sec. 176.05(11), entitled
"Restrictions on Premises Under Retail "Class A" or "Class B" license,
contains almost word for word the same language as Sec. 66.05(10)
(i) (2). It is conceivable that the legislature meant that in the absence
of the proprietor licensee the operator licensee is no longer his agent
and that the operator assumes responsibility for his own acts and those
of others working under him and that the proprietor licensee would
not be responsible for violations committed in his absence.
However, when various other sections of the Wisconsin Statutes
are examined, they compel the conclusion that the intent of the jegislature was to place primary emphasis and responsibility on the proprietor
licensee and not on the operator licensee. For instance: A retailer (who
is the proprietor licensee) shall mean any person who shall sell, barter,
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exchange, offer for sale or have in posession with intent to sell any
fermented malt beverages [Sec. 66.05(10) (a) (4)], while an operator shall be one who merely draws or removes any fermented malt beverage for sale or consumption [Sec. 66.05(10)(a)]. The license fee
for a Class B retail license shall be determined by the city, village or
town in which said licensed premises are located but shall not exceed
$100 per year [Sec. 66.05(10) (g) (2)], while the fee for an operator
is not to exceed $5.00 per year [Sec. 66.05(10) (i) (3)], thereby implying that an operator's position and a proprietor's as to accountability
for offenses on the premises are not comparable. The proprietor
licensee is required by Sec. 66.05(10)(g)(4) to display a sign disclosing the brand of beer served, and shall not substitute any other
brand for that so designated. No similar duty is placed on the operator.
Certainly, then, the proprietor licensee is the one on whom falls the
responsibility for keeping the premises closed during the hours designated in Sec. 176.06(3), and is the one who is to be in active control
and supervision of his premises, to such a degree that he cannot
escape punishment because the operator was also licensed. As said in
Hershorn v. People, 113 P. 2nd 680 (1941), "Hershorn cannot escape
guilt by attempting to shift the crime to his employee and must stand
or fall with those who acted for him. So long as he has the management, direction and supervision of the busintess and place in which
liquor was being sold, he assumes the risk of criminal liability when his
agents, working under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence,
sold liquor" contrary to statute. Even'in Sec. 176.05(11) the language
implies that the requirement is primarily directed toward the proprietor
licensee by the very wording of the statute.
Not only the language of the statute, but the safeguard of public
morals and public policy suggest that any attempt to relieve the proprietor of responsibility for acts done in his establishment and to
weaken the long line of decisions which hold him for acts done in
his absence and against his instructions be frowned upon. Were the
operator licensee alone responsible for a sale of liquor after hours, an
unscrupulous proprietor might hire equally unscrupulous operators to
serve liquor after 1 A.M. in a Class B retail establishment, take a
chance on not being apprehended at once, reap a nice profit for afterhour sales, and in turn promise to pay the operator's fine if and when
he be arrested. After the removal of the first operator, he might be
followed by a second and a third,---thus allowing a scheme for putting
money into the pocket of the proprietor unlawfully, while he went
"Scott free," except for the possible payment of an occasional fine, in
fulfillment of his part of an illegal bargain. Needless to say, such procedure would defeat the purpose of the legislation and would be cer-
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tainly contrary to proper conceptions of correct control and regulation
of the liquor business.
With a decision such as State v. Grams, supra, as law, proprietor
licensees will find it behooves them to hire only honest, reliable operators who will obey all provisions of the law, in order to protect themselves from prosecution.
JANE O'MELIA.

Federal Procedure-Applicability of Discovery Procedure under
Federal Rules to the United States.--In an action by the United
States, the General Motors Corporation and others were charged with
engaging in conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce. The defendants answered and filed forty-five interrogatories under Rule 33 of the
Rules of Federal Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following Sec. 723c, which
they asked the government to answer. It was contended by the Government that Rule 33 "substitutes interrogatories for a bill of discovery"; that the United States has never consented to be a defendant
in such a bill, or to answer interrogatories; and that the rule substantially changes legal rights. The court held that while an action does
not lie against a sovereign except by consent and while the United
States could not be compelled to make discovery in an action brought
for that purpose, still the government in bringing a civil action against
an individual may be subjected to the ordinary rules governing procedure in the court in which the suit is brought and that, accordingly,
the Government could be required to answer the interrogatories.
United States v. General Motor Corporation,2 F.R.D. 528 (N.D. Ill.
E.D. 1942).
In the instant case, the court pointed out that although Rule 33
does not specifically include the United States as subject to it, the fact
that Rule 37(f) which provides that the payment of attorney's fees
imposed for failure to answer interrogatories are not to be imposed on
the United States, shows that Rule 33 was meant to apply to the
United States. It might further be pointed out that a reading of the
Federal Rules as a whole indicates that they were meant generally to
apply to the Government as well as any other party to a civil action.
Rule 12 specifically extends the time within which the United States
may plead to sixty days. Rule 4 makes an exception of the United
States in the procedure of service of process on the United States.
And most imperative is Rule 81 wherein all the exceptions to the
Rules are cited: and nowhere in Rule 81 is the United States exempt
from the general application of the Rules. And furthermore, the cases
have consistently held that in a civil action the United States takes
the same position as any other private suitor. United States v. National

